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Abstract
Using newly constructed data series on explosions, deaths, and steamboat traf-
fic, we examine econometrically the causes of increased safety in steamboat boil-
ers in the nineteenth century. Although the law of 1852 (but not that of 1838) did
have a dramatic initial effect in reducing explosions, that reduction came against
the background not of a system out of control but of a system that from the begin-
ning was steadily increasing boiler safety per person- mile. The role of the federal
government in conducting and disseminating basic research on boiler technology
may have been more significant for increased safety than its explicit regulatory
efforts.
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Introduction.
The harmful side-effects of modern technology are a popular subject for
newspaper headlines and television news magazines — from automobile
crashes and airline disasters to industrial catastrophes like the one a few
years ago in Bophal, India.  Moreover, some forms of technological side-
effects (notably those arising from toxic substances like asbestos) are
beginning to strain present-day regulatory structures — a strain often
described as a “crisis” for the legal system and the insurance industry.  But
the harmful effects of technology are not a new phenomenon: they have been
with us as long as technology has.  And the modern regulatory system was
not created overnight; it grew out of a long history of institutions aimed at
controlling harms — not only government institutions but also legal and
market ones.
This paper attempt to illuminate the present-day issues by going back
to the history of one particular 19th-century area of technological harms:
steamboat boiler explosions.  Indeed, it was the  problem of boiler explosions
on steamboats that led to the first instance of federal safety regulation (in
18381 and again in 18522), which in turn served as a precedent for the
government’s more extensive subsequent interventions into private markets.
                                               
1 5 U. S. Statutes at Large 305 (1838).
2. 10 U. S. Statutes at Large. 10 (1852).
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In “Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power,” historian of technology
John G. Burke (1966)3 offered a kind of Whig history of how the federal
government started down the path of safety regulation.  In his account, a
failed “unregulated” system in the early nineteenth century gave way to
increasingly enlightened federal safety regulation.  The pressure of a public
outcry over the loss of life — by Hunter's (1949) estimate some 3,270 persons
in the whole U.S. between 1816 and 1848 — coupled with the united efforts
of the “scientifically and technically knowledgeable members of society” led to
the slow demise of an ideology in which “the enlightened self-interest of an
entrepreneur sufficed to guarantee public safety” (Burke 1966, pp. 3 and 2).
In Burke’s view, this ideological change was thrust upon a reluctant country
by the exigencies of modern technology.
This essay looks at a small piece of the story, namely the unexamined
contention that the “unregulated” system was failing in a way that falsified
contemporary anti-interventionist presumptions.  Using newly constructed
data series on explosions, deaths, and steamboat traffic (both tonnage and
person-miles traveled), we examine econometrically the causes of increased
safety in steamboat boilers.  Our conclusion is that, although the law of 1852
(but not that of 1838) did have a dramatic initial effect in reducing
explosions, that reduction came against the background not of a system out
                                               
3. A similar and partially complementary analysis is Bartrip's (1980) discussion of the
regulation of stationary boilers in Great Britain.  On the American case see also Brown
(1989).
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of control but of a system that from the beginning was steadily increasing
boiler safety per person-mile.  In the end, we suggest, the role of the federal
government in conducting and disseminating basic research on boiler
technology may have been more significant for increased safety than its
explicit regulatory efforts.
Steamboat Explosions and Safety.
As with any historical data, it is difficult to get accurate figures on steamboat
explosions and the deaths they caused. Modern accounts of the boiler safety
issue —  including Hunter (1949), Burke (1966) and Brown (1989) — rely on
only contemporary newspaper accounts and government reports of
explosions.  Recently, however, Denault (1993) has supplemented and
corrected these data using authoritative directories, notably the “Losses of
United States Merchant Steam Vessels, 1790-1868” in Lytle-Holdcamper
(1975) and the accounts of western-river steamboats in Way (1983).
To determine the safety of steamboat travel, however, one needs to
know not only the number of deaths from explosions but also the number of
person-miles traveled.  Hunter (1949, p. 521) lamented that “[l]ack of
information on mileage and number of passengers makes it impossible to fix
the hazards of steamboat travel in terms even roughly comparable to data on
travel hazards by present-day modes of transportation.”  Since Hunter wrote,
however, Haites, Mak, and Walton (1975) and Haites and Mak (1978) have
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constructed estimates of tonnage and people (passenger + crew) miles.
Denault (1993) has updated these estimates using a newer edition of Lytle-
Holdcamper (1975).  Table 1 sets out these estimates.  They illustrate a
dramatic increase over the period in the volume of river transportation.
Year Tonnage Passengermiles
(million)
Crew
miles
(million)
Year Tonnage Passengermiles
(million)
Crew
miles
(million)
1825 11419 30.6 19.7 1843 84552 568.1 278.4
1826 15913 46.4 29.0 1844 94002 637.6 316.1
1827 19521 59.4 37.3 1845 98489 689.9 341.1
1828 19567 61.8 39.7 1846 108722 777.3 379.2
1829 22590 77.1 48.0 1847 124119 917.1 437.5
1830 25158 61.8 39.7 1848 135127 1042.7 486.5
1831 29414 109.9 69.0 1849 131137 1032.0 480.3
1832 36817 140.2 90.3 1850 136610 1115.9 508.4
1833 38488 157.9 99.6 1851 146264 1239.5 552.3
1834 43099 182.0 116.9 1852 160736 1420.0 615.5
1835 52305 261.0 147.6 1853 176613 1607.9 686.7
1836 59048 300.1 170.5 1854 176451 1635.0 697.7
1837 66931 354.6 197.2 1855 179157 1699.4 719.6
1838 69405 385.4 208.4 1856 194169 1839.1 780.0
1839 82040 454.0 252.4 1857 208617 1976.4 838.1
1840 86312 497.7 270.3 1858 205293 1944.8 824.7
1841 87856 525.4 280.5 1859 202498 1911.4 814.0
1842 79622 496.1 258.7 1860 206800 1945.6 831.8
Table 1.
Tonnage, passenger mileage, and crew mileage, 1825-1860
Source: Denault (1993), appendices B and E.
Table 2 combines estimates of steamboat explosions and fatalities with the
data for person-miles.
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Year Explosions Deaths
1825 .07952 .59642
1826 .06631 .15915
1827 .03102 .04137
1828 .02956 .31527
1829 .01599 .07994
1830 .10094 1.15074
1831 .01118 .06708
1832 .00868 .01735
1833 .02330 .33010
1834 .02007 .09702
1835 .02203 .24474
1836 .02550 .19975
1837 .02175 .23378
1838 .02358 .47491
1839 .00991 .10476
1840 .00911 .05859
1841 .00620 .03847
1842 .01457 .13911
1843 .01063 .07206
1844 .00944 .05243
1845 .01261 .08147
1846 .00519 .04496
1847 .01107 .11516
1848 .01112 .08436
1849 .00661 .08332
1850 .00985 .15761
1851 .00558 .08371
1852 .00786 .11692
1853 .00218 .00436
1854 .00429 .04887
1855 .00289 .02150
1856 .00115 .00764
1857 .00142 .01279
1858 .00181 .03539
1859 .00257 .05027
1860 .00216 .03997
Table 2.
Explosions and deaths per million person-miles, 1825-1860
Source: Denault (1993), Table 11, p. 183.
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Year Deaths
1923-27 .1820
1928-32 .1560
1933-37 .1555
1943-47 .1052
1957 .0598
1967 .0550
1977 .0335
1987 .0263
Table 3
Automobile deaths per million vehicle miles, selected years .
Source: National Safety Council, Accident Facts 1990 .
These estimates permit us in fact to make some rough comparisons
with modern modes of transportation.  Table 3 presents estimates of
automobile safety for selected years.  The numbers aren’t fully comparable,
as the automobile data are in terms of vehicle-miles rather than passenger
miles.  But it is clear that steamboat safety (at least with respect to boiler
safety)4 was of the same order magnitude as that of automobile travel for
most of the twentieth century.  Also, the fatality rate for railroads in 1900
was 0.057 deaths per million passenger miles (U. S. Interstate Commerce
Commission 1900).5  And there is reason to think that stagecoaches and
                                               
4 These figures do not include accidents from snags, fires, and other non-explosion hazards.
5 This figure overestimates the safety of railroads, as it excludes employee deaths, which
exceeded passenger deaths by ten to one.
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ocean-going vessels were considerably more dangerous than contemporary
steamboats (Denault 1993, p. 93).  Needless to say, of course, it was public
perception of risk rather than actual relative safety that is significant for the
origins of regulation.  As Hunter (1949, p. 522) put it, what “aroused public
opinion and moved legislative bodies was less the cold calculation of total
losses and relative risks than the shock of individual disasters which did not
occur at an exotic distance, but frequently at one’s doorstep.”  Indeed, the
bias of the spectacular6 is still with us: as McKenzie (1991, pp. 76-78) points
out, the public believed airline safety to have been declining in the 1980s
even though it was actually improving.
0 
0.02 
0.04 
0.06 
0.08 
0.1 
0.12 
1825 1830 1835 1840 1845 1850 1855 1860 
Figure 1
Explosions per million person-miles, 1825-1860
                                               
6 A form of what cognitive psychologists and decision theorists would call availability bias.
See for example
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Figures 1 and 2 present in graphical form the data on explosions and
fatalities per person-mile over the period 1825-1860.  We analyze these data
more formally below.  But it is clear from these figures that the overall trend
was toward greater safety, and this trend was pronounced well before federal
regulation.  Figure three presents the data for deaths per million person-
miles in semi-log form, which makes the trend show up more visibly.
0 
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0.8 
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1825 1829 1833 1837 1841 1845 1849 1853 1857 
Figure 2
Deaths per million person-miles, 1825-1860
- 9 -
Figure 3
Log of deaths per million person-miles, 1825-1860
What caused boiler safety?
If one agrees that the overall trend in western river steamboat travel was
toward greater safety, the obvious question becomes: what led to that greater
safety.  We place the possibilities under three headings: Technological
change; organizational change; and government regulation.
Technological change.
By technological change we mean the gradual improvement in both
machinery and techniques of practice.  These had two principal sources: the
incremental, empirical, groping evolution of technology and practice that
- 10 -
came from the legion of boilermakers, shipbuilders, captains, and engineers,
and the more scientific, if no less empirical, knowledge of abstract boiler
design and the physics of steam developed by researchers at the Franklin
Institute and elsewhere.
As Hunter (1949, p. 121) notes, the history of steamboat engine design
and construction
is one of plodding progress in which inventions in the formal
sense counted far less than a multitude of minor improvements,
adjustments, and  adaptations.  The heroes of the piece were ...
the anonymous and unheroic craftsmen, shop foremen, and
master mechanics in whose hands rested the daily job of making
things go and making them go a little better.  The story of the
evolution of steamboat machinery in the end resolves itself in
large part into such seemingly small matters as, for instance,
machining a shaft to hundredths rather than sixteenths of an
inch, or devising a cylinder packing which would increase the
effective pressure a few pounds, or altering the design of a boiler
so that cleaning could be accomplished in three hours instead of
six and would be necessary only every other instead of every
trip.
This “plodding progress” was aided by the fact that a dominant design of a
steamboat engine set in early.  Once a dominant design is established, it
permits technological change to proceed steadily and incrementally.7  In
steamboats, the dominant design consisted of a simple, high-pressure,
horizontal steam engine fed by a battery of cylindrical boilers.  The engines
were crude by the standards of stationary boilers or the low-pressure boilers
                                               
7 On which, for example, see Utterback (1994).
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more typical on east-coast steamboats.8  But they were extremely well
adapted to an environment in which fuel was in relatively abundant supply
and capital and skill in relatively short supply.  “At the close of the thirties,”
as Hunter (1949, p. 139) notes, “this engine had reached, in its essential
features, its fully developed form.”  The trajectory of technological
development thereafter was toward more power. Two engines driving
independent paddle wheels became common, with a typical battery of up to
seven boilers, each some 32 feet long and 42 inches in diameter.  Each boiler
contained two internal flues and had a firebox at one end.  It was made of
wrought iron (with cast iron heads in the early years) of one-quarter inch in
thickness, and was riveted together with the joints staggered for greater
strength.
Technological change also brought slow improvement in safety
equipment.9  In the years just before the passage of the regulations of 1852, a
number of key safety technologies came into widespread use.  Glass tube
gauges became practicable around 1850 with the development of an alkali-
free glass that would resist clouding up under the effects of steam.  These
                                               
8 It is not obviously the case, however, that, as many contemporaries believed, high-
pressure boilers were more dangerous than low-pressure boilers. In the period before
1932, in fact, there were more injuries from explosions of (largely eastern) lower-
pressure boilers than from explosions of high-pressure boilers.  See Committee on
Steamboats Report, May 18, 1932 (U. S. House of Representatives Document 478, ser.
228 [Washington: 22d Congress, 1st session]).
9 This paragraph draws on Denault (1993), chapter IV.
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replaced the try-cock gauges that had been in universal use since 1843.10
About the same time, wrought iron replaced cast iron for boiler heads as
problems of suitably forming the wrought iron were solved.  Most
importantly, perhaps, the years before 1852 saw the widespread adoption of
“doctor pumps,” so called because they cured the ills of steam boilers.  One of
the principal facts about steamboat boiler explosions is that they occurred
overwhelmingly at or near docks.  The reason was that steamboats would
typically continue to generate steam while stopped to pick up or discharge
passengers or freight.  This obviated recreating a head of steam at each stop
and thus saved valuable time.  Before the doctor pump, however, the pumps
feeding water to the boilers ran off the main drive shaft and would cease to
operate while the boat was stopped.  As a consequence, water levels could
become dangerously low, exposing metal to the fires and thus weakening the
boiler.11  The doctor pump allowed water to be fed to the boilers even when
the boat was docked.
Advances in scientific knowledge — or, at any rate, more abstract
technological knowledge — also contributed to increased safety, even if the
diffusion of that knowledge was a slow process.  Already by the 1820s, there
                                               
10 It is true, however, that the act of 1852, which required steam gauges, accelerated their
adoption.  Between 1850 and 1860, some 30 patents for steam gauges were awarded, in
contrast with almost no patents before that time (Hunter 1949, p. 164).
11 As we will see, contemporary practitioners were remarkably ignorant about the
theoretical causes of boiler explosions, and this explanation was unknown to them, even
though the empirical relationship between low water and explosions was well known.
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was much concern voiced in government over the problems of steamboat
boiler explosions.  In 1830 — by far the most dangerous year in our sample —
the destruction of the Helen McGregor near Memphis took some 60 lives and
galvanized the federal government to action.  Although it stopped short of
adopting any regulation, the House instructed Treasury Secretary Samuel D.
Ingham to investigate and report on boiler accidents.  In what is considered
the first federal grant for scientific research (Dupree 1957, p. 50), Ingham
provided funds to the Franklin Institute of Philadelphia, founded six years
earlier to promote the mechanical arts and applied science, to conduct a
study.  Between 1831 and 1836, an Institute team headed by Alexander
Dallas Bache, a professor of natural philosophy at Penn, conducted careful
experiments of various kinds, even to the point of blowing up test boilers in a
quarry outside Philadelphia.
The group’s findings overturned a current myth, proving
conclusively that water did not decompose into hydrogen and
oxygen inside the boiler, with the former gas exploding at some
high temperature. The experimenters demonstrated that an
explosion could occur without a sudden increase in of pressure.
Another widely held theory they disproved was that when water
was injected into a boiler filled with hot and unsaturated steam,
it flashed into an extremely high-pressure vapor, which caused
the boiler to rupture.  The group proved that the reverse was
true: the larger the quantity of water  thus introduced, the
greater the decrease in the steam pressure (Burke 1966, p. 13).
The team also made suggestions about the inadequacy of test cock gauges,
the use of fusible alloys, and the quality of wrought iron.
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Although the Franklin Institute study influenced Congress in what
eventually became the safety act of 1838, the report was not widely known
among practitioners on the rivers, and was in fact printed in only 500 copies
in addition to its publications serially in The Journal of the Franklin
Institute  (Denault 1993, p. 115).  It is, moreover, clear, as evidenced in the
debates surrounding proposed reforms of the 1838 act, that confusion
continued to reign about the causes of boiler explosions.  In 1848, Edmund
Burke, the Commissioner of Patents, undertook another study of the causes
of boiler explosions.  His report featured long abstracts of the Franklin
Institute Study, by then ten years old.  Burke’s report was issued in 1849,
with a printing of 10,000 copies.  The year 1849 is thus arguably a watershed
in popular understanding of the abstract properties of steam, the causes of
boiler explosions, and the basics of sound boiler design and maintenance.
Organizational issues.
In contemporary debates over boiler safety, technological issues shared the
spotlight with — and often took a back seat to — issues of what would
nowadays be called human factors.  The problem, many argued, was not so
much that well-managed boilers were dangerous but rather that boilers were
often incompetently managed.
Especially in the early years, steamboat captains were often boat
owners or (more typically) part owners, and, as a consequence, were often
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less experienced in steamboat operation than were their subordinates.12  The
main complaint against captains was racing, a legendary but perhaps
debatable cause of boiler explosions.  It was to the engineer, however, that
the finger of blame most often pointed.  Whereas river piloting was already a
well-developed skill (among keelboatmen and bargemen) at the beginning of
the steam era, the steamboat owners could draw on no similar pool of
knowledgeable steam engineers.  With the rapid growth of western river
steam, this class of worker always remained in short supply, and it is
difficult to underestimate the amount of criticism directed at the abilities and
character of engineers.  These men served apprenticeships as short as three
months, and, as we have seen, possessed little genuine knowledge of steam
operation.  They were often accused of negligence, drunkenness, and — that
worst of all nineteenth-century faults — possessing an inferior character.
But the skill and behavior of the crew members were certainly under
the control of the steamboat owners to some extent.  Economists would no
doubt insist that owners would invest in training and supervision if the cost
of doing so outweighed the benefits.  These costs and benefits, in turn,
depend on the “governance structures”13 under which the steamboat was
organized.  In the early years, it was common for steamboats to be owned by
consortia of five or more owners.  These included merchants, steamboat
                                               
12 The actual steering and navigation of the boat was entrusted to the pilot, who, by all
accounts, was typically highly skilled and conscientious. Hunter (1949, pp. 240 ff.).
13 A term from Williamson (1985).
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builders, and others with local knowledge of river transport who would
integrate forward or backward into boat ownership.  Limited liability joint-
stock companies were not common until the very end of our period, so most of
the steamboats were owned either as associations of part owners or
partnerships (Hunter 1949, p. 311).  It is interesting, however, that the trend
throughout our period was for ownership to become concentrated.  As Table 4
suggests, ownership by groups of more than five owners declined while single
proprietorships increased.  (Ownership by two to four persons remained
relatively constant.)  A simple model of management and ownership14 would
suggest that increased concentration of ownership in a pre-corporate world
would reduce the costs and increase the marginal benefits of training and
monitoring, leading to increased boiler safety.
1 Owner 2-4 Owners 5 or More Corporate
Ownership
Year Number Tonnage Number Tonnage Number Tonnage Number Tonnage
1830 18.9 14.9 56.8 55.0 24.3 30.1 — —
1840 17.3 19.6 51.2 48.2 31.5 32.2 — —
1860 27.4 25.2 51.8 52.3 14.3 15.3 6.5 7.2
Table 4
Steamboat ownership, 1830, 1840, 1860 (in percent).
Source: Hunter (1949, p. 311).
                                               
14 Along the lines suggested by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), for example.
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Regulation. 15
The early history of federal debates over boiler regulation is a history of
Congressional reaction to spectacular steamboat explosions.  In 1824, the
Aetna exploded in New York harbor, killing 13 persons.  A bill was promptly
introduce in the House calling for an inquiry into the possibility of outlawing
high-pressure boilers,16 but the bill died soon after being reported out of
committee.  As we saw, the Helen McGregor disaster in 1830 prompted the
funding of the Franklin Institute study as well as legislation in 1832 that
would have required federally funded inspections and would have outlawed
building steam without adequate water supply while a boat was stopped.
The legislation did not pass.
In general, early proponents of regulation tended to be Whigs, and
opponents, citing the sanctity of property rights granted by the Constitution,
tended to be Democrats.  Nonetheless, Democratic Presidents Jackson and
Van Buren supported legislation,17 and on Van Buren’s urging the Senate
passed a bill in early 1838.  It was, however, the disaster of the Moselle  near
Cincinnati, which killed 151 in April of that year, that galvanized the House
into action.  The resulting statute — the first federal safety regulation —
                                               
15 This section draws on Hunter (1949, chapter 13), Burke (1966), and Denault (1993,
chapter VIII).
16 Unlike most eastern steamboats, the Aetna used high-pressure boilers, which were the
technology of choice on the western rivers.
17 The Democrats, however, tended to favor ex post and non-adminsitrative measures, as
typicfied by the provision in the 1838 statute that made the fact of a boiler explosion
prima facie evidence of negligence in tort.
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created a rather toothless inspection system and made some changes in tort
and criminal law as an attempted deterrent to negligence.
Inspectors under the 1838 statute were appointed by local federal
judges.  They were required to inspect boilers semiannually, but the law
provided no criteria for such inspection. The boat owners were to pay $5 for
each inspection, which was the inspector’s sole source of income.  As one
might expect, inspections under this system were often perfunctory when not
fraudulent, and, indeed, even thorough visual inspections not complemented
by hydrostatic testing were essentially useless.  The law also made boat
owners clearly liable for damages, made employees liable to manslaughter
changes in the cases of negligent death, and made the fact of an explosion
prima facie  evidence of negligence.  For a number of reasons, however,
including contemporary attitudes toward lawsuits and the typical judgment-
proofness of impecunious steamboat owners, few suits were ever brought.18
Dissatisfaction with the 1838 statute began almost as soon as the ink
was dry.  In 1852, Congress passed the second boiler safety statute.  Even
though most of the bills opponents were Democrats, the legislation enjoyed
bi-partisan support — perhaps a testimony to changing attitudes toward
government interference with private property right.  Interestingly, although
east-coast ship owners tended to oppose legislation, western ship owners
                                               
18 For a thorough analysis of legal cases and doctrine, see Denault (1993), chapter VII.
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wanted the inspection system changed so that, among other things, the
government and not the owners themselves would pay for the inspections.
The 1852 statute did just this, setting up the federal Steamboat Inspection
Service.19 Inspectors were given broad discretion to order changes at any
time, and were required to test boilers hydrostatically each year at one and
one-half times working pressure, which could in no case exceed 110 psi.
Inspectors were also empowered to license engineers and pilots.20  In
addition, the law required safety valves — one in a locked case to prevent
tampering — and the provision of adequate feed water.  And it required that
boilers be constructed of iron plate stamped according to quality.  At the
urging of owners, the law removed the provision of the 1838 statute making
an explosion prima facie  evidence of negligence, even despite the lack of suits
and despite the strict standards to which owners would have been held in
any case under common law.
Regression results.
In order to explore more formally the evolution of safety over time and the
effectiveness of the federal safety acts of 1838 and 1852, we regressed the log
of both explosions and deaths per million person miles against time, and we
                                               
19 In fact, the new inspection system did not supersede the old, which continued to apply
for many years to boats not carrying passengers.
20 Steamboat owners and other businessmen pushed for this provision as well (Hunter
1949, p. 538), possibly as a way to shift some of the costs of training and selection onto
the government and the engineers themselves and/or to solve a prisoners’ dilemma
problem by eliminating the incentive to hire unqualified engineers.
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introduced dummy variables for the regulations of 1838 and 1852.  The
results of the OLS model are shown in table 5.
Explosions Deaths
Intercept -18.857** -24.802*
(-2.85) (-1.96)
TIME -0.176*** -0.190**
(-4.069) (-2.304)
LAGE 1.747 3.52
(1.22) (1.29)
LFLTWT 4.129** 5.848
(2.21) (1.64)
REG52 -1.049*** -1.755***
(-3.37) (-2.96)
R2 0.882 0.43
Notes:  t-statistics in parenthesis. R2 is the adjusted coefficient of multiple
determination.  Asterisks denote significance at the 1 percent (***), 5
percent (**), and 1 percent (*) levels.
Table 5
OLS regression results.
The variables LAGE and LFLTWT deserve comment.  LAGE is the log of the
average age of the western steamboat fleet.  We use it as a proxy for the age
of the boilers in use on western waters.  The average age of the fleet ranged
from a low of 3.14 years in 1832 to 3.51 years in 1860.  In general, the
average age of the fleet increased over time.  Keeping in mind the general
increase in speed and days running per year, this means that over time
boilers ran for longer periods in a given year and for more years than did
their predecessors.  We thus expected the age variable capture the “vintage”
effect of using older boilers.  In both the explosion and deaths equations,
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however, this variable has the expected positive sign, but it is not
statistically significant.
The variable FLTWGT, the log of the weighted average of people loads,
is a proxy for congestion on steamboats, which both increased in size over
time (allowing them to carry more people per trip) and began to carry more
passengers on a per-ton basis.  Such congestion should reduce safety per
million people miles.  Curiously, perhaps, this variable is significant and has
the expected sign in the explosion equation, but it is not significant in the
deaths equation.
REG52 is a dummy variable, set to one in years 1853-1860, that
attempts to proxy the effect of the regulation of 1852.  It is clearly significant,
with the expected negative sign, in both equations.  (We used a similar
dummy for the 1838 regulation.  It was never significant, and we do not even
bother to report the model including it.)
Given the kind of data we have here, an alternative estimation procedure
would be to use a model appropriate for “count” data.  That is, because the
observations on the number of explosions and deaths are non-negative integers,
an appropriate approach is one that uses a statistical framework based on a
discrete probability distribution.  One such statistical framework is the Poisson
model.
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The loglikelihood function of the Poisson model is specified as
log(f) = y* log(b) - b-log(y),
where y is the dependent variable (explosions or deaths), and b is a linear
function of the various explanatory variables.  The signs of the coefficients
(positive or negative) imply that increases in the explanatory variable increase
or decrease the expected value of the dependent variable (explosions or deaths).
The maximum-likelihood results of the Poisson model are reported in Table 6.
As in the OLS model, the results show that the 1852 legislation had a negative
and statistically significant effect on the number of explosions and deaths.
Explosions Deaths
Intercept -0.0390 -1.578
(-0.846) (-1.05)
TIME -0.00358 0.0561
(-0.314) (1.51)
TIME2 -0.00149 *** -0.0293***
(-4.18) (-2.49)
Age 0.0443 -0.0748
(0.317) (-0.174)
FLTWGT 0.116*** 0.0881***
(13.10) (2.85)
REG52 -1.631*** -1.080***
(-20.12) (-3.74)
Log-likelihood
Notes:  t-statistics in parenthesis. Asterisks denote significance at the 1 percent (***),
5 percent (**), and 1 percent (*) levels.
Table 6
The Poisson model.
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In order to make more precise the connection between the significance
of this dummy and the regulation, we tried the OLS version of the explosions
model with dummies in alternate years — 1850, 1848, 1854, and 1856.  The
dummies for years before 1852 were not significant.  The dummies for years
after 1852 were significant, but not significant at as high a level as the 1852
dummy.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept -14.730* -6.811* -11.889 -8.343
(-1.73) (-0.84) (-1.79) (-1.33)
TIME -0.162*** -0.131** -0.145*** -0.126***
(-3.13) (-2.63) (-3.182) (-2.78)
LAGE 1.935 1.719 1.778 1.684
(1.19) (1.03) (1.13) (1.07)
LFLTWT 2.928 0.742 2.144 1.150
(1.23) (0.32) (1.15) (1.76)
D1850 -0.556
(-1.35)
D1848 0.034
(0.084)
D1854 -0.632**
(-2.03)
D1856 -0.60**
(-1.97)
R2 0.771 0.757 0.786 0.784
Notes:  t-statistics in parenthesis. R2 is the adjusted coefficient of multiple
determination.  Asterisks denote significance at the 1 percent (***), 5
percent (**), and 1 percent (*) levels.
Table 6
Alternate dummy variables
In using the binary variable REG52, we are assuming that the slope coefficients
are the same for the pre- and post-legislation periods and that the regulation
affects the intercept only. This is not necessarily so, however, and the slope
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coefficients could have been different for the two periods.  We use a Chow test to
evaluate whether the two samples (before legislation and after legislation) are
structurally different.  To perform a Chow test of the hypothesis that all
coefficients specified in the equations are equal for the inspection and non-
inspection periods, it is necessary to estimate the coefficients for each model for
both periods as well as for the entire period.  One records the sum of squared
residuals (SSR), the degrees of freedom (df), and the number of explanatory
variables (k), and then computes the F statistic and compares it with the critical
value as given in a statistical table.  If the computed F value is greater than
critical value of the F-distribution, the null hypothesis that the coefficients for
the two periods are equal is rejected.  We use the following regression results to
perform the Chow test:
1825-1860
LEXMI = -0.559 - 0.096TIME + 1.192 LAGE - 0.229 LFLWGT
       (-0.109) (-2.159)     (0.773)     (-0.177)
k=4 N1= 36  df= 31  SSR1 = 7.936
1825-1851
LEXMI = -12.54 - 0.148 TIME + 0.720 LAGE + 0.355 LFLWGT
        (-1.874) (-3.080)    (0.504)      (1.609)
k=4 N2=27  df = 22 SSR2 = 4.61
1852-1860
LEXMI = 53.49 - 0.166 TIME  + 10.92 LAGE  - 15.044 LFTWGT
       (2.599)  (-1.750)     (2.536)       (-2.723)
k= 4 N3= 9 df= 4 SSR3 = 0.50
F  =     [SSR1 - (SSR2 + SSR3)]/k
     (SSR2  + SSR3)/ [(N2 + N3) - 2k]
=     [7.938 - [4.61 - 0.500]/4         = 5.31
   (4.61 + 0.50)/ [(27 + 9) - 2*8]
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The critical F statistic for 4 explanatory variables and 28 degrees of freedom is
2.71, at the 95 percent level of confidence.  The table value is less than the
computed value, and therefore we must reject the null hypothesis that the
coefficients from the two periods are equal.
The results of the Chow test suggest that there were changes that
occurred during the period after the safety act was put in place that affected the
slope coefficients.  Although this doesn’t rule out the possibility that the change
in regime arose from factors other than the regulation, it certainly fails to
disconfirm the significance of the 1852 legislation.
We are thus left with an overall downward trend in explosions and deaths
per million person-miles — a trend arguably attributable to technological and
organizational change in steamboating, coupled with a shift after 1852 that was
likely the result of safety legislation and (especially) the hydrostatic tests it
required.  We can thus ask the following question.  What would have been the
number of deaths and explosions during the inspection period if we assume that
the slope coefficients did not change?  To answer the question, we use the
estimated coefficients for the pre-inspection period to compute what would have
been the expected values of explosions per million person-miles during the post
inspection period.  We can then compare the  computed with the actual values of
explosions per mile.  The comparisons helps determine what the number of
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explosions per mile would have been in absence of the regulation or other
changes.
Table 7 reports the actual explosions and the expected explosions per
million person-miles for the period 1853 to 1860.  In all cases, the expected
explosions per mile assuming the pre-inspection coefficients are higher than the
actual explosions.  Thus, although there would have been a consistent decline in
the number of explosions per million person-miles in the absence of the
regulation, it appears that the regulation did play an important role in reducing
the number of explosions.
Year Actual (with regulation) Expected (no regulation)
1853   0.00218 0.00950
1854   0.00476 0.00812
1855   0.00289 0.00750
1856   0.00127 0.00636
1857   0.00142 0.00573
1858   0.00180 0.00558
1859   0.00256 0.00490
1860   0.00216 0.00373
Table 7
Projected and actual explosions per million person-miles 1853-1860.
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